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Abstract: Is public or private sector provision of water more likely to succeed in urban 
areas of Cambodia?  Using quantitative and qualitative data from a range of surveys and 
technical assessments, this paper compares consumer satisfaction and technical 
performance of four private and four public utilities in Cambodia.  The results indicate 
that households served by private utilities are significantly more satisfied with the piped 
water than customers of public utilities: the daily availability and quality of piped water is 
better, and service interruptions are less frequent.  This has not happened by accident.  
Private utilities hire more educated staff whom they pay higher salaries; maintain their 
facilities on a more regular basis; and implement quality control programs more 
diligently.  Private sector operators seem to face stronger incentives than public utilities 
to keep their customers satisfied.  However, this improved service does not come for free 
and, consequently, does not yet reach all the available households.  Households served by 
private utilities pay significantly more for piped water services, and some lower-income 
households that are not served by private utilities are partially limited by the high 
connection fees (as opposed to the regular monthly payments).  Overall, while this recent 
effort to introduce private sector involvement in the water sector in Cambodia is 
encouraging, the full gains have not yet been realized.  The commercial incentive for 
improved performance will likely be stronger if the privatization option used is a lease or 
concession arrangement; if there is more competition in the water market; and if the 
regulatory structure in Cambodia encourages commercial incentives to be more demand-
responsive and cost conscious.  Under these conditions, the private sector is a good bet. 
 
Keywords: water supply, privatization, urban infrastructure, Cambodia. 
 
JEL Codes:  017, Q31, R51. 








  Cambodia is actively seeking to develop water supply organizations that function 
well and, more broadly, a well-functioning water sector, as are other developing 
countries.  It is possible to have well-functioning urban water companies managed and 
operated by either the public sector or the private sector.  However, a key question to be 
answered is which choice offers Cambodia the best chance for significant improvement 
over the current arrangements.   
 
  As part of this process, Cambodia is experimenting with the introduction of the 
private sector in the management and operation of water supply organizations.  In the 
past three years, water utilities in three provincial towns initiated the use of private sector 
operators.  In the other 20 provincial towns in Cambodia, public utilities continue to be 
primarily responsible for the provision of water.  In one of these, Kandal, a private 
company owns and operates part of the system. 
 
  Because this is so new in Cambodia, it is not known how well the private water 
utilities are performing and how well they are doing in comparison with the public 
utilities.  Up to now no systematic performance assessments have been carried out, so the 
quantity and quality of the services they provide are not known.  Nor is it known whether 
consumers are satisfied with the quality and quantity of services provided, which is a 
fundamental test of performance.  Therefore, it is important to evaluate whether 
privatization of public utilities in these four towns has improved the delivery of water 
(increased the quantity and improved the quality of water consumed) in order to provide 
clues for future choices. 
   
  The objective of this paper is to assess and compare the performance and 
consumer satisfaction with services provided by the newer private companies and the 
more traditional public utilities.  Specifically, the paper: (1) analyzes the level and quality 
of water services provided by private water companies and public utilities, and consumer 
reactions to these services; and (2) assesses whether there has been any significant 
change in the level and quality of water services provided as a result of private sector 
involvement. 
 
                                                 
1  This paper was prepared for the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility in the World Bank.  We 
would like to thank Vijay Jagannathan for the opportunity to carry out the study.  Also, thanks are due to 
the local team in Cambodia (M.S. Shivakumar, M. Kumbakumba, Chea Sarin, Han Phoumin, Ea Sophy, 
Nun Vanny, Meak Chhavannarey, and Venkatesh Sundararaman) that implemented the household and 
water utility surveys and carried out the technical assessments of water systems.  We are also grateful to Ian 
McGuire of Middlebury College for his excellent research assistance.   2
2.  Public vs. Private Provision of Urban Water: The General 
Case 
 
  Private sector participation in water delivery is a relatively recent phenomenon in 
most developing countries.  Up until 1990, almost all developing countries relied on 
government provision of water supply services (Silva, Tynan, Yilmaz 1999).  However, 
in the past ten years, the disappointing performance of many (not all) public sector 
companies--as well as fiscal challenges--has encouraged many governments to look for 
alternative, more efficient ways of providing water services.  Increasingly, they have 
turned to private sector solutions. 
 
  Although not open and shut, there is a strong case for encouraging more private 
sector involvement in the management and operation of urban water supply 
organizations.  This case has three elements: (1) the dismal results of past attempts to 
substantially improve the performance of water supply and other organizations while 
retaining a preference for public sector management and operations (see, for example, 
World Bank 1995); (2) the growing evidence of the beneficial effect of private sector 
involvement where it has been tried; and (3) a persuasive explanation of these differing 
outcomes in terms of the relative incentive structures likely to face private and public 
sector organizations. 
 
  While it is not guaranteed, private sector participants generally face stronger 
incentives to be responsive to the demand for their services from users than do public 
sector participants.  This is not because private sector participants are the “good” guys 
and public sector participants the “bad” guys.  It is because, when the private sector is 
required to be responsible for normal commercial risks (as they should be), they depend 
much more than public sector participants on providing services that people want and for 
which they are willing to pay; and to control costs to increase net revenue.  Public sector 
operators, who are generally less reliant on revenues from their customers to sustain their 
investments and operations and more reliant on government investments and operational 
budgets or grants, face weaker incentives to be responsive to demand.  Put another way, 
public sector participants have to develop different strategies for resource allocation (how 
they utilize the money available to them) and for resource mobilization (how they raise 
the money available), while for the private sector operator, the two strategies are more 
nearly identical because of the ‘revenue from users’ requirement to sustain their 
investments.  For the private sector operator, both strategies necessarily focus on users 
and their demand. 
 
  This outcome is contingent on the degree to which the private sector participant 
continues to be willing to assume the responsibility for future commercial risks.  In turn, 
his willingness to do this is dependent on credible assurances that the government will 
not, in the future, make arbitrary decisions about pricing and additional assignment of 
responsibilities beyond those initially agreed between the operator and the government.  
The different options for private sector participation (service contracts, management 
contracts, BOTs, lease contracts, concessions, and outright sale of assets) differ 
considerably in the degree to which the private sector participant can be expected to take   3
and be responsible for commercial risks, and the degree to which credible government 
assurances require an explicit regulatory structure to be in place.  The relevant positive 
incentive effects are likely to be strongest in the case of the last three options. 
 
  Although there are other incentive issues that could be discussed (see the next 
section), the most important requirement from the perspectives of this paper is that the 
private sector operator receives sufficient credible assurances from the government that 
the operator is willing t o accept the commercial risks that are implicit in his future 
revenue projections.  For then, the operator will have strong incentives to maintain a 
future revenue stream by being responsive to current and potential customers and, also, to 
control costs while doing so.     
 
3.  Private and Public Water Utilities in Cambodia: Specific Results 
 
  In 1997 and 1998, water utilities in four out of 23 provincial towns in 
Cambodia—Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Speau, Takeo, and Kandal—began to use 
private sector operators.
2  In three of these towns—Banteay Meanchey, Kampong Speau, 
and Takeo—private sector companies are currently the sole network providers of water in 
the core area of the provincial town.  By contrast, in Kandal, the private sector company 
operates the network outside the core area of the town, in Kien Svay.  The core area of 
town is still taken care of by a public utility.
3    
 
  The form of privatization varied across towns.  In Banteay Meanchey, Kampong 
Speau, and Takeo, the Ministry of Industry, Mines, and Energy (MIME) granted private 
companies a three-year renewable license to supply water to residential consumers in the 
area.  The renewal of these licenses depends on company’s compliance with water quality 
and tariff stipulations.  In addition, each of these private companies entered into a 
contract to transfer the assets of the water utility to the company for 23-40 years, after 
which all assets are to revert to the public sector.  In Kien Svay, by contrast, no public 
assets were transferred to the private company.  Instead, the private company entered into 
a built-own-operate (BOO) contract with MIME. 
 
  In none of the four provincial towns, which now use private operators, were the 
conditions for privatization ideal to maximize positive institutional  incentives. The 
privatization process was ad hoc and non-transparent (De Raet and Subbarao 1999).  
Private companies were not solicited through open and competitive bidding.  In each 
town the process was triggered by unsolicited bids.  In Banteay Meanchey, Kampong 
Speau and Takeo, individuals who submitted these bids were granted the license without  
competition.  In Kandal, one of the two bidders was selected, but it is not known what 
criteria were used to select the winner. 
 
                                                 
2 Takeo is 75 kilometers south, Kampong Speau is about the same distance east, and Kandal to northwest of 
Phnom Penh.  Banteay Meanchey is located in northern Cambodia.   
3 In each of these provincial towns, there also is a large number of private water vendors that serve 
households not connected to the network.   4
  Further, there is currently n o overall regulatory framework governing the 
operations of these private companies and existing regulation is deficient (De Raet and 
Subbarao 1999).  For example, it is not clear how water tariffs will be revised and 
contractual disputes settled.  The licenses and contracts for the companies are ambiguous, 
therefore, on some important issues that have an impact on incentives.  The government 
is aware of this and is attempting to rectify the situation.  Hopefully, they will do so in a 
way that takes into account the incentive effects of future government and regulatory 
actions on private operators to enhance the positive results.  Nevertheless, in each of 
these provincial towns and with considerable residual uncertainty, private companies 
have been willing to make investments--sometimes substantial--to rehabilitate and 
expand water supply networks in their respective market areas. 
 
  The rest of the provincial towns in Cambodia are currently served by public water 
utilities.  Most of these utilities were shut down during the Khmer Rouge regime and 
were reopened in the 1980s with seriously depleted facilities.  Some of them have since 
been rehabilitated with support from different donor agencies, rather than private 
investment. 
 
  To compare the current performance of private and public water utilities, in 
addition to the four towns served by private companies (Banteay Meanchey, Kampong 
Speau, Takeo, Kandal), four provincial towns served by public utilities were selected for 
the study.  These towns were selected randomly to avoid selection bias, and they are 
Kandal, Battambang, Kampong Chhang, and Svay Rieng.
4  Kandal appears in both lists 
because both private and public utilities serve the market area. The private portion is 
called Kien Svay in this paper. Table 1 summarizes the staffing, production capacity, 
coverage, and fees of the eight private and public water utilities included in the study.   
 
 
                                                 
4 Battambang is the second largest city of Cambodia, and located close to Thai border in the northwest 
corner of the country.  Kampong Chhang is a port and fishing town on the Tonle Sap river in the middle of 
Cambodia.  Finally, Svay Rieng is located in Southern Cambodia close to the Vietnam border.   5
Table 1:  Selected Production and Financial Characteristics of Eight Water Utilities in Cambodia 
  PUBLIC UTILITIES  PRIVATE UTILITIES 
  Battambang  Kampong 
Chhang 




Kien Svay  Takeo 
Population of town  139,964  41,703  58,264  21,205  98,848  41,478  58,264  39,186 
Year established in current form  1993  1996  1979  1980  1998  1997  1998  1997 
Staffing: 
Number of permanent staff  65  8  16  16  20  6  10  15 
Number of temporary staff  0  0  0  0  6  8  0  N/A 
Monthly salary of staff (Riels)  130,000  45,000  50,000  47,000  285,000  494,000  326,800  N/A 
Monthly salary of operation and 
maintenance worker (Riels) 
120,000  45,000  50,000  47,000  200,000  304,000  304,000  N/A 
Production Capacity: 
Current production capacity 
(m
3/day) 
3750  960  780  400  3000  1500  1632  1300 
Current production m
3/day  2750*  200*  780  320  1200  560*  176  120 
Capacity utilized (%)  73.33  20.83  100  80  40  37.33  10.78  9.23 
Coverage: 
Total number of direct 
connections from utility: 
1766  409  580  393  1500  1700  230  450 
•  Residential  1618  406  561  375  1423  1510  229  N/A 
•  Business  78  N/A  5  N/A  50  180  N/A  N/A 
•  Government   70  2  14  18  25  10  1  13 
Percentage of households covered   6.33  5.28  5.47  9.13  7.74  19.93  2.24  6.21 
Subcontractors: 
Number of sub-contractors to 
utility 
4  0  3  0  0  0  0  0 
Number of connections served by 
sub-contractors 
2046  0  239  0  0  0  0  0 
Connection fees and tariffs: 






350,000  76,000  190,000  228,000 
Water tariff (Riels/m
3)  1400  1000  550  600  1300  1500  1400  N/A 
Notes: * based on production meter reads. All salaries and fees in Cambodian Riels (3763 Riels/1 US$) 
             Some information on the utility in Takeo is missing since the manager of the utility declined to respond to a formal survey.   6
A.  Staffing  
 
  Private utilities have a slightly smaller permanent staff than public utilities 
surveyed.  While the size of permanent staff in private utilities varies from 6 to 20 
(average 13), public utilities have 8 to 65 (average 26) permanent staff members on the 
payroll.  To supplement the permanent staff, private utilities--unlike public utilities--do 
hire temporary workers.  These workers typically assist with the maintenance and tariff 
collection in different localities.
5  All utilities reported to have some staff on the premises 
all times. 
 
  Utility managers’ level of education also differs systematically across private and 
public utilities surveyed: managers of all private utilities have more formal schooling 
than do the managers of public utilities.  Managers of private utilities have either high 
school or university education, whereas managers of public utilities have a secondary 
school background.  
 
  Private utilities pay their staff--including operations and maintenance (O&M) 
workers--much more than the public utilities surveyed.  The average salaries for staff and 
O&M workers in private utilities are 368,600 and 269,333 Riels, respectively--in contrast 
to 68,000 and 65,500 Riels in public utilities.
6  
 
B.  Production Capacity  
   
  Most private water utilities reported lower capacity utilization rates than public 
utilities.  The young age of private utilities and relatively dilapidated condition of public 
utilities may partially explain this result.   All utilities, both private and public, reported 
to have increased their production capacity in the past two years. 
 
C.  Coverage  
 
  However, neither public nor private utilities have so far reached many people in 
their market area.  In each town, the percentage of households served by a water utility is 
low: the coverage of private water utilities varies from 2 to 20 percent of all households, 
whereas the coverage of public utilities ranges from 5 to 9 percent.  As expected, the 
majority of connections served by private and public utilities are residential.  Table 1 
summarizes the number of residential, business, and government connections served by 
each utility. 
 
  In addition to direct connections, public utilities in Battambang and Kandal have 
sub-contractors that are authorized to resell water to other households.  Specifically, 
                                                 
5 For example, in Kampong Speau, the utility has eight “block managers” who monitor the network and 
collect tariffs in their locality.  As compensation, they are paid a percentage of the tariff collected.  The 
overall network maintenance is the responsibility of permanent utility staff. 
6 As shown in the table, three of the four public utilities pay their staff no more than 50,000 Riels per month 
-- the equivalent of $13 per month.   7
these sub-contractors have been given permission to extend the piped network beyond 
their individual connections to other households in the area and charge a fixed tariff for 
the water sold.  In Battambang, the utility currently has three subcontractors and the 
utility in Kandal has three.  The number of connections served by subcontractors has 
increased rapidly in Battambang.  Currently, subcontractors in that town serve a larger 
number of residential connections (2046) than the utility itself does (1618).  Interestingly, 
all subcontractors in Kandal and at least some in Battambang are employees of the water 
utility.
7  
   
D.  Connection Fees and Tariffs 
 
  All private utilities, unlike public utilities surveyed, charge a fixed connection fee 
from their customers.  These fees are listed in Table 1 and range from 76,000 Riels to 
350,000 Riels.
8  They cover all labor charges, cost of piping materials, the water meter, 
and other connection expenses.  All private utilities, except the utility in Kampong Speau, 
require their customers to pay the fee in lump sum. 
 
  The method of setting the connection fee varies across public utilities surveyed. 
The connection fee for utilities in Kampong Chhang and Kandal depends on the distance 
of the customer from the network.  Accordingly, their fees range from 136,500 to 
390,000 Riels, include all connection costs, a nd are to be paid in lump sum.  In 
Battambang, the utility charges a fixed, all-inclusive fee of 200,000 Riels for new 
connections.  Unlike other public utilities, it provides its customers an option to pay the 
fee in installments.  Finally, in Svay Rieng, unlike in any other utility surveyed, 
customers who want a connection need to purchase the water meter, piping and other 
materials, and obtain all the needed permits and clearances themselves.  They pay to the 
utility only for the labor charges related to connection, which vary between 5,000 and 
35,000 Riels depending on the distance from the network.   
 
  Private utilities charge higher tariffs for water consumed than do public utilities 
surveyed.  Both private and public utilities charge their customers a uniform tariff per a 
cubic meter of water consumed.  This tariff is the same for residential, business, and 
government connections.  In private utilities, the tariff varies from 1300 to 1500 Riels/m
3.  
In public utilities surveyed, it ranges between 550 and 1400 Riels/m
3.  All utilities, except 
the utility in Svay Rieng, have metered all their connections and bill customers on a 
monthly basis based on meter readings.   Currently, no utility charges its customers a 
minimum monthly fee.   
 
  Unlike the utility in Kandal, the utility in Battambang charges its subcontractors a 
different—lower—tariff.  While its other customers with direct connections are charged 
1400 Riels/m
3  of water, subcontractors pay for water 1375 Riels/m
3.  These 
subcontractors in turn are allowed to charge their customers up to 2000 Riels/m
3 of water 
                                                 
7 It is not clear what criteria were used to select subcontractors in Battambang and whether all 
subcontractors are employees of the utility. 
8 The exchange rate at the time of data collection was 1 USD=3900 Riels.   8
delivered.  By contrast, in Kandal, subcontractors are permitted to charge 550-1200 
Riels/m
3 for the water. 
 
  To assess the performance of these private and public utilities as well as 
household satisfaction with the water services they provide, a range of primary data was 
collected from all eight provincial towns.  First, in each town a sample of households was 
surveyed and asked to assess the quality of water services.  Second, the managers of eight 
utilities were interviewed and technical performance of each utility independently 
assessed by a water engineer.  The next sections describe the results of these exercises. 
 
 
4.  Household Assessment of Performance of Water Utilities 
 
  In each town a sample of households served by the water utility was surveyed to 
gauge the level of user satisfaction with services and to get users’ perception of other 
aspects of service delivery.  In each town, 50 randomly selected households that were 
served by either public (Battambang, Kandal, Kampong Chhang and Svay Rieng) or 
private (Banteay Meanchey, Kien Svay, Kampong Speau, Takeo) utilities were surveyed.  
In addition, for the two public utilities that have subcontractors (Battambang and 
Kandal), 25 and 26 randomly selected households served by these sub-contractors were 
surveyed, respectively.  
 
  The results of these household assessments of satisfaction, water quality, 
water availability, reliability of service, frequency of service breakdowns and 
maintenance, cost of service, and service-orientation of utilities were somewhat mixed 
across the different categories and the different utilities.  However, overall the user 
responses were favorable to the private utilities on most categories.  The next sections 
review the major findings and provide disaggregated information on the results by 
individual towns.   
 
  A.  Customer Satisfaction 
 
  Households served by private utilities are more satisfied with the quality of piped 
water than households served by either public utilities or subcontractors.  Table 2 
summarizes the results on household satisfaction for each category of utilities (public, 
subcontractor, private).  It shows that 82 percent of households served by private utilities 
reported satisfaction with the quality of piped water, while only 56 and 45 percent of 
households served by public utilities or subcontractors, respectively, are satisfied with the 
service.  
   9
Table 2:  Customer Satisfaction: Satisfaction with Water Services




0.56 0.44 0.32 0.84 0.64
(0.50) (0.47) (0.37) (0.48)
0.93 0.90 0.98 0.86 0.96












Kien Svay Kompong 
Speu
Takeo
0.82 0.82 1.00 0.70 0.76
(0.38) (0.00) (0.46) (0.43)
0.93 0.96 1.00 0.82 0.92
(0.20) (0.00) (0.39) (0.27)
Notes: Means and (standard deviations) for water service variables.
Satisfied with quality of 
water







Satisfied with quality of 
water
Satisfied with water 
service
Satisfied with quality of 
water




  Assessing household satisfaction across different categories of water utilities 
while controlling for town-level characteristics confirms that customer satisfaction with 
the quality of water is increasing with private sector involvement.  The town of Kandal, 
that has a public and private water utility (Kien Svay) and subcontractors, provides an 
opportunity to compare these three types of delivery modes with varying degree of 
private sector involvement, while controlling for town-level characteristics.  As Table 2 
reveals, in Kandal, household satisfaction with the quality of water is steadily increasing 
as private sector involvement intensifies: 32, 44, and 100 percent of households served by 
public utilities, subcontractors, and private utilities, respectively, are satisfied with the 
quality of water.   
 
  Satisfaction with water quality, however, varies within each category of utilities.  
Among private utilities, the share of households satisfied with water quality ranges from 
70 to 100 percent.  The utility in Kien Svay reaps the highest household satisfaction 
scores: all households served by the utility reported satisfaction with water quality.  
Among public utilities, the share of households satisfied with the quality of water varies 
between 32 and 84 percent.  The utility in Kampong Chhang stands out in that category.  
It has the second highest level of household satisfaction with water quality across all 
utilities surveyed: over 80 percent of households served are satisfied with water quality.    
 
  Surprisingly, household satisfaction with the piped water service overall does not 
vary across public and private water utilities.  As can be seen from Table 2, over 90 
percent of households served by private utilities, public utilities, or subcontractors   10
reported to be satisfied with the service they get.  According to the Cambodian survey 
team, Cambodians’ reluctance to express dissatisfaction may partly explain this result.  
Also, it may reflect the lack of awareness of alternatives.   
 
  What is behind these differences in consumer satisfaction?  Household 
assessments of water quality, availability, frequency of breakdowns and maintenance, 




B.  Water Quality 
 
  Household assessment of piped water quality mirrors the results on household 
satisfaction.  Each household surveyed was asked to evaluate various attributes of piped 
water, such as its clarity and overall quality.  The main results of this assessment are 
reported in Table 3.  
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0.27 0.22 0.14 0.36 0.36
(0.42) (0.35) (0.48) (0.48)
0.27 0.28 0.12 0.30 0.38
(0.45) (0.33) (0.46) (0.49)
0.65 0.44 0.62 0.80 0.72
(0.50) (0.49) (0.40) (0.45)
0.22 0.26 0.46 0.06 0.08


















Kien Svay Kompong 
Speu
Takeo
0.49 0.50 0.80 0.28 0.38
(0.50) (0.40) (0.45) (0.49)
0.07 0.08 0.00 0.20 0.00
(0.27) (0.00) (0.40) (0.00)
0.84 0.88 1.00 0.54 0.92
(0.32) (0.00) (0.50) (0.27)
0.13 0.26 0.02 0.00 0.22
(0.44) (0.14) (0.00) (0.42)
Notes: Means and (standard deviations) for project design variables.
See text for descriptions of variables.




Don't drink the 
water
Very good or good 
quality
Very bad or bad 
quality
Very good or good 
quality
Very bad or bad 
quality
Clear water
Don't drink the 
water
Very good or good 
quality







  A larger share of households served by private than by public utilities judged the 
quality of piped water to be good.  As Table 3 indicates, 49 percent of households served 
by private utilities, and only 27 percent of households served public utilities, said that the 
water quality is either good or very good.  Further, 27 percent of households with 
connections from public utilities and only seven percent of households served by private 
utilities reported the piped water to be of bad or very bad quality.  84 percent of   12
households served by private and 65 percent of households  served by public utilities 
considered the piped water clear. 
 
  The case of Kandal, which can be used to compare the performance of private and 
public utilities and subcontractors while controlling for town-level characteristics, 
provides further support to the result that private sector participation tends to lead to the 
delivery of better quality water.  While only 14 percent of households served by the 
public utility in Kandal assessed the quality of piped water to be good or very good; 32 
percent of households served by sub-contractors and 80 percent of households served by 
private utilities—the highest share of customers across all utilities--rated the quality of 
piped water high.   
 
  The quality of piped water was not, however, judged to be equally high across all 
private utilities.  Household evaluation of the quality of piped water was significantly 
worse in Kampong Speau than in other towns served by private utilities.  Only 28 percent 
of households served by the utility considered the quality of water to be good, while 20 
percent of households stated that the quality of piped water is bad or very bad.  This 
result is consistent with low household satisfaction, discussed in the previous section.  
   13
  C.  Water Availability 
 
  Differences in the availability of piped water to households also help to explain 
the differences in household satisfaction with water services.  Piped water availability is 
measured here in two ways: whether it is available to households every day; and by the 
number of hours per day it is typically available.  
  As Table 4 indicates, the piped water availability is higher in households served 
by private utilities than in households served by public utilities. 76 percent of households 
served by private utilities, but only 57 percent of households served by public utilities, 
have piped water available every day.  While households served by private utilities have 
water available from the system on average for 21 hours per day, households served by 
public utilities get piped water on average only for about six hours per day.   
Comparison of households served by public utilities with those served by their 
sub-contractors reveals that even sub-contracting modestly improves water delivery by 
increasing the hours piped water is available.  On average, households served by sub-
contractors have piped water available for two hours more per day than households 
served by public utilities. 
  Assessing piped water availability to households while controlling for town-level 
characteristics confirms these r esults: private sector participation improves water 
availability.  In Kandal, households served by public utilities have water available for 5.5 
hours per day; those served by sub-contractors about 8 hours per day; and those served by 
the private utility in Kien Svay 24 hours per day.  The percentage of households reporting 
water to be available every day is following a similar pattern.   
 
  Private sector participation, however, by no means ensures water availability 24 
hours per day.  As Table 4 indicates, the performance of private utilities in this respect 
varies.  Specifically, the performance of the utility in Kampong Speau again significantly 
differs from the performance of other private utilities.  While all other private utilities 
provide a 24-hour service to households, the utility in Kampong Speau delivers piped 








6.1 8.2 6.1 5.5 4.5
(1.08) (3.56) (2.22) (5.87)
0.57 0.82 0.66 0.16 0.62
(0.39) (0.48) (0.37) (0.49)
0.22 0.10 0.26 0.12 0.38
(0.30) (0.44) (0.33) (0.49)
0.41 0.26 0.26 0.48 0.62


















Kien Svay Kompong 
Speu
Takeo
21.3 24.0 24.0 13.4 23.9
(0.00) (0.00) (4.51) (0.59)
0.76 0.58 0.90 0.72 0.84
(0.49) (0.30) (0.45) (0.37)
0.05 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.04
(0.14) (0.00) (0.35) (0.20)
0.38 0.34 0.00 0.50 0.66
(0.47) (0.00) (0.51) (0.48)
Notes: Means and (standard deviations) for project design variables.
See text for descriptions of variables.
Table 4:  Performance of Water Systems: Water Availability and Use
Public
Hours of water availability in 
wet season
Piped water available every day
Water availability has increased 
over the last two years
Household consumes more 
water now than two years ago
Sub-contract
Hours of water availability in 
wet season
Piped water available every day
Water availability has increased 
over the last two years.
Household consumes more 
water now than two years ago.
Private
Hours of water availability in 
wet season
Piped water available every day
Water availability has increased 
over the last two years.
Household consumes more 
water now than two years ago.
 
   
  Though public utilities’ daily hours of operation are shorter than private utilities’ 
hours of operation, public utilities have improved their water delivery over the past two 
years.  On average, 22 percent of households served by public utilities stated that the 
daily availability of piped water has improved over the past two years.  This is not   15
surprising, given that public utilities were partly destroyed during the Khmer Rouge 
regime, and, therefore, in a bad condition when they were re-opened. 
 
  D.  Service Breakdowns and Maintenance 
 
  The results of the household survey reveal that private water utilities provide a 
slightly more reliable service than public utilities.  Reliable service refers here to water 
being available every day and when the customer expects it.  81 percent of households 
served by private and 78 percent served by public utilities judged their water supply as 
reliable.  
 
Households served by public utilities experience more service interruptions than 
households served by private utilities or subcontractors, as reported in Table 5.  While 13 
percent of households served by public utilities reported that, in the past three months, the 
service had been stopped for a day or more, only six percent of households served by 
private utilities or subcontractors acknowledged having similar interruptions of service.  
Sixteen percent of households served by private utilities, compared to seven percent of 
households served by public utilities, however, said that there are more service 
breakdowns now than two years ago.  This is not surprising, given that many of the 
private utilities have been in operation for only a couple of years. 
 
The results from the water utility surveys also suggest that the public utilities 
receive more complaints from customers.  Only one (Kien Svay) of the three private 
utilities reported that they had received a single complaint in the previous month.  All 




  Further, a slightly larger share of households served by private utilities or 
subcontractors than by public utilities consider the piped network to be well maintained.  
Ninety, 94, and 85 percent of households served by private utilities, subcontractors, and 
public utilities, respectively, said the network is well maintained.  While 42 percent of 
households with connections from public utilities stated that there are currently leaking 
pipes in town, 35 and 37 percent of households served by private and subcontractor, 
respectively, said the same. 
                                                 
9 The number of reported monthly complaints in the four public utilities are one (Kandal), five 
(Battambang), three (Kampong Chhang) and three (Svay Rieng).    16
Table 5:  Performance of Public and Private Water Systems: 








0.78 0.78 0.96 0.46 0.92
  (0.42) (0.20) (0.50) (0.27)
0.13 0.04 0.04 0.34 0.08
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.48) (0.27)
0.07 0.06 0.00 0.18 0.02
  (0.24) (0.00) (0.39) (0.14)
0.42 0.32 0.40 0.50 0.46
  (0.47) (0.49) (0.51) (0.50)
0.85 0.78 0.86 0.84 0.90

























0.81 0.90 0.98 0.52 0.84
(0.30) (0.14) (0.50) (0.37)
0.06 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.10
(0.24) 0.00 (0.27) (0.30)
0.16 0.04 0.00 0.46 0.14
(0.20) 0.00 (0.50) (0.35)
0.35 0.66 0.04 0.50 0.18
(0.47) (0.20) (0.51) (0.39)
0.90 0.98 0.98 0.66 0.96
(0.14) (0.14) (0.48) (0.20)
Notes: means and (standard deviations) for project design variables.
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  These results belie a fairly large variation in household assessments within each 
category of utilities.  Among public utilities, the utility in Kampong Chhang, that is rated 
high on the quality of water, has the worst record of service reliability and frequency of 
service breakdowns.  Thirty-four percent of its customers reported that the service had 
been stopped to their house for a day or more in the past three months, and a half of 
respondents said that there are leaking pipes in town.  Among private utilities, the utility 
in Kampong Speau is again an outlier: households served by the utility experience more 
often service breakdowns than households served by other private utilities.  As a result, 
household assessment of the service reliability is significantly lower in Kampong Speau 
than in other towns. 
 
 
E.  Cost of Service 
 
  The results of the household survey confirm that private utilities charge on 
average a higher connection fee from customers than public utilities.   While households 
surveyed paid on average 219,684 Riels to private utilities for a connection, the average 
cost of connection from a public utility was 186,926 Riels.  This can be seen from Table 
6.  The connection fees households reported to have paid matched approximately 
utilities’ stipulated fees listed in Table 1, except in the case of utilities in Kampong 
Chhang and Kampong Speau.  In Kampong Chhang,  the average connection fee 
households reported to have been paid was lower than the fee currently imposed by the 
utility (168,319 Riels compared to 190,00-342,000 Riels).  By contrast, in Kampong 
Speau, the average fee households reported to have paid to the utility was significantly 
higher than the fee posted by the utility (113,334 Riels compared to 76,000 Riels).  
Interestingly, while almost all households served by other private utilities reported to 
have received a receipt for their payment, only 72 percent of households served by the 
utility in Kampong Speau had obtained one.  According to Cambodians, payments made 
without receipts often do not enter into the official records of the utility.  Overall, the 
results indicate that private utilities have more often issued receipts than public ones. 
   18




186,926          203,042           312,460           168,319        63,884           
(146,559)         (142,498)         (90,622)         (73,864)          
0.80 0.69 0.75 0.83 0.92
(0.47) (0.44) (0.38) (0.27)
6.9                  15.3 2.5 7.6 2.1
(43.5) (2.5) (10.0) (1.6)
13,818            26,806             10,318             10,390          7,759             
(26034) (4191) (8795) (5370)
888                 1,402 550 1,000 601
(14) (0) (0) (7)
Cubic meters 




159,990          159,990           510,360          
(44,098)           (1,099,514)     
0.83 0.83 0.72
(0.39)               (0.46)              
2.2                  2.2 4.1
(1.9)                 (6.2)                
17,308            17,308             11,721            
(11,907)           (4,280)            
1,400              1,823 784
(163)                (229)               
Cubic meters 









219,684          343,200           194,200           113,334        228,000         
(18,455)           (14,581)           (60,198)         (7,677)            
0.92 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.98
(0.00)               (0.00)               (0.46)             (0.14)              
2.2                  1.4 1.9 3.1 2.2
(1.0)                 (2.1)                 (3.9)               (2.5)                
20,894            18,704             20,553             21,305          23,012           
(13,793)           (6,776)             (42,724)         (21,332)          
1,489              1,312 1,400 1,503 1,739
(59)                  (0)                    (229)              (323)               
Cubic meters 
consumed 14.0 14.3 14.7 14.2 13.2
Notes: Means and (standard deviations) for water service variables.
All fees in Cambodian Riels (3763 Riels/1 US$)
Private
 Connection fee 
(Riels) 
Received receipt for 
connection
Number of days to get 
connection
 Amount of last 
monthly bill (Riels) 
Unit tariff (Riels per 
cubic meter)
Sub-contractor
Number of days to get 
connection
 Amount of last 
monthly bill (Riels) 
Unit tariff (Riels per 
cubic meter)
 Connection fee 
(Riels) 
Received receipt for 
connection
Number of days to get 
connection
 Amount of last 
monthly bill (Riels) 






 Connection fee 
(Riels) 
Received receipt for 
connection  19
  Further, private utilities provide connections faster than public utilities.  
According to results, it takes from one to three days to get a connection from a private 
utility.  By contrast, getting a connection from a public utility can take from two to fifteen 
days, the average time being about seven days. 
 
  The results of the household survey also confirm that the unit tariff of water tends 
to be higher in private than in public utilities.  The average unit tariff charged by private 
utilities is 1,489 Riels, while the average unit tariff charged by public utilities is 888 
Riels.  The unit tariffs households reported to pay were consistent with tariffs posted by 
utilities.  The average unit tariff households served by subcontractors pay is 1,400 Riels.  
The unit tariffs charged by subcontractors in Battambang and Kandal are within the 
authorized range. 
 
  F.  Service-orientation  
 
  Finally, to evaluate service-orientation of utilities, households were asked a series 
of questions about the responsiveness of utility staff.  Among other things, it was inquired 
whether they can contact the utility and get assistance if they have inquiries about the 
service or billing; whether they have ever had a problem with billing; and whether the 
staff of the utility takes customer complaints and inquiries seriously and attempts to 
improve the service.  To cross-check these results, all the utilities were also asked a series 
of questions about their own perception of the customer service that they deliver.    
 
  As results in Table 7 indicate, the household assessments of utility service-
orientation do not vary in any systematic pattern across different categories of utilities.  
Staffs of public and private utilities are viewed to be equally responsive.  Almost all 
households said that they can contact the utility if they have inquiries about the service or 
billing.  About a half of households served by public and a half of households served by 
private utilities considered the utility staff to take customers’ complaints and inquiries 
seriously.  Only five percent of households served by public and four percent of 
households served by private utilities had had a problem with billing. 
 
  This result is surprising.  Given the incentives faced by private utilities (discussed 
in section 2), one would expect household perception of service-orientation differ across 
private and public utilities.  In fact, the results from the water utility surveys also suggest 
that the public utilities--at least by their own assessments--are as responsive as private 
utilities.  All reporting public and private utilities alike respond that they have some staff 
dedicated to customer services, that they encourage customers to report problems, and 
that they responded to all complaints that they received last month.
10 
                                                 
10 Although, as noted above, the public utilities tended to receive more complaints every month.   20
Table 7:  Service Orientation of Water Utilities




0.52 0.56 0.44 0.52 0.56
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
0.05 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.08
(0.27) (0.14) 0.00 (0.27)
0.55 0.66 0.54 0.26 0.72














Kien Svay Kompong 
Speu
Takeo
0.47 0.50 0.42 0.42 0.52
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
0.04 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.02
(0.27) 0.00 (0.20) (0.14)
0.31 0.30 0.10 0.60 0.24
(0.46) (0.30) (1.59) (0.43)




Staff is responsive to 
complaints and inquiries
Private
Have had billing problem
Operation has improved in last 
two years
Sub-contractor
Have had billing problem
Operation has improved in last 
two years
Staff is responsive to 
complaints and inquiries
Have had billing problem
Operation has improved in last 
two years




  More than half of households (55 percent) connected to a piped networked 
managed by a public utility held that the operation of the utility had improved in the past 
two years.  Only one-third of households served by private utilities said the same.  The 
lower initial level of public utilities may again explain this result. 
 
In summary, the household assessment of private utilities is more favorable than 
the assessment of public utilities.  In particular, the percentage of households which 
reported satisfaction with the quality of water, thought the water to be good or very good, 
had water available every day for more hours a day, thought the water was more reliable, 
had fewer stoppages, believed the network to be well maintained, and got a connection 
quicker were higher with private operators than with public operators.  In addition, fewer 
of those served by private operators thought they got very bad or bad water and fewer did 
not drink the water.   
 
Surprisingly, 93 out of 100 households said they were satisfied with the services 
regardless of which type of system provided them—public or private.  This could be a 
general reluctance to express dissatisfaction or lack of awareness of alternatives.  Two   21
categories suggest a need for caution.  First, users judged public utilities to be slightly 
more responsive to complaints and inquiries than private utilities.  This may be partly due 
to the absence of competition in these early experiments with private sector operators and 
the incomplete set of institutional incentives. Second, private operators charged more for 
connection and monthly bills tended to be higher than those of their public counterparts. 
While this could reflect accurately what is needed to sustain and nourish investment, it 
remains a concern in Cambodia given very low rates of coverage of the population given 
the finding that the vast majority of those unconnected expressed an interest in getting a 
piped connection. 
 
  Are these results consistent with the technical assessment of utilities?  The next 
section will explore this question.     
 
5.  Technical Assessment of Performance of Water Utilities  
 
To get an independent assessment of the technical performance of the eight 
utilities, a water engineer evaluated the performance and maintenance of facilities in each 
town.  Performance indicators used included the condition and daily operation of 
facilities; frequency of major breakdowns; frequency of maintenance; and 
implementation of water quality control programs. 
 
A.  Facility Performance 
 
  The results of the technical assessment confirmed that the daily hours of operation 
are significantly higher among private than public utilities.  Table 8, which summarizes 
the condition and daily operation of facilities, shows that all private utilities, except the 
utility in Kampong Speau, distribute piped water 24 hours a day.  This is consistent with 
household reports discussed in the previous section.  The distribution system of public 
utilities, by contrast, operates between 8 and 12 hours a day, according to the technical 
assessment.  These hours of operation are, however, inconsistent with household reports, 
which indicate that households served by public utilities have water available only 4-8 
hours per day. 
 
  Further, the results indicate that the frequency of major breakdowns is less 
common in private than public utilities.  Among private utilities, the utility in Kampong 
Speau is reported to have a major breakdown in its source works once in every six 
months, and the distribution system in the utility in Banteay Meanchey is reported to 
break down approximately once a year.  Among public utilities, the utilities in Kandal 
and Svay Rieng have most problems.  The treatment facilities of the Kandal utility were 
out of service at the time of the survey due to a major breakdown.  Also, the distribution 
system of the utility fails about once in six months.  The utility in Svay Rieng has no 
water treatment facilities, and, like the utility in Kandal, it has major problems with its 
distribution system twice a year. 
   22
  The percentage of non-working connection is zero or negligible in all but one 
utility.  About ten percent of connections served by the public utility in Kampong Chhang 
are out of service. 
 
  Finally, meters and pumps used by public utilities are significantly older in public 
than in private utilities.  The age of meters varies from three to 15 years and the age of 
pumps from three to seven in public utilities, whereas private utilities have meters and 
pumps that are one or two years old.   
   23
Battambang Kandal Kompong 
Chhnang
Svay Rieng














10 . 8 5
Frequency of Major 
Breakdowns 
Never Never Never Never













10 12 8 5



















10 12 8 5
Frequency of Major 
Breakdowns 
Never Never Never Never




10 Out of service 8 No treatment 
present
Frequency of Major 
Breakdowns 
Never Out of service Never No treatment 
present














10 12 4 3
Frequency of Major 
Breakdowns 
Never Never Never Never
Distribution Condition Functioning Functioning Functioning Functioning
Daily operation 
(hours per day)
10 12 8 8
Frequency of Major 
Breakdowns 
Never Once in six 
months
Never Once in six 
months
Connections Percentage of non-
working
0.0% 0.9% 9.8% 0.0%
Age (years) Pumps 7 4 3 5
Meters 7 15 3 5




Kien Svay Kompong 
Speu
Takeo














18 2 10 4
Frequency of Major 
Breakdowns 
Never Never Never .













18 2 10 4
Frequency of Major 
Breakdowns 
Never Never Once in six 
months
Once in six 
months













18 2 10 4
Frequency of Major 
Breakdowns 
Never Never Never Never













18 2 . 4
Frequency of Major 
Breakdowns 
Never Never Never Never














24 24 15 24
Frequency of Major 
Breakdowns 
Never Never Never Never














24 24 15 24
Frequency of Major 
Breakdowns 
Once a year Never Never Never
Connections Percentage of non-
working
0% 0% 1% .
Age (years) Pumps 2 1 2 2
Meters 2 1 2 2
Table 8:  Technical Assessment of Water Utilities: Facility Performance (continued)
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  B.  Maintenance 
 
  The results of technical assessment reveal that private utilities maintain their 
facilities better than public utilities.  As can be seen from Table 9, public utilities 
maintain their facilities (pump stations, source works, transmission, treatment, storage, 
distribution) only when there is a crisis and action has to be taken.  As an exception, the 
utility in Svay Rieng maintains its distribution system--but not its other facilities--on a 
weekly basis.  This is in stark contrast to the maintenance practices of private utilities.  
All private utilities carry out regular maintenance of all their facilities on a weekly or 
monthly basis as a preventive measure. 
 
Public
Battambang Kandal Kompong 
Chhnang
Svay Rieng
Frequency of Regular 
Maintenance
Pump Stations Never Never Never Never
Source works Never Never Never Never
Transmission Never Never Never Never
Treatment Never Never Never Never
Storage Never Never Never Never
Distribution Never Never Never Weekly
Implementation of water 
quality control programs
Chlorine in water Yes No Yes Yes
Regularly cleans 
filters




Kien Svay Kompong 
Speu
Takeo
Frequency of Regular 
Maintenance
Pump Stations Monthly Weekly Monthly Monthly
Source works Weekly Weekly Monthly Weekly
Transmission Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly
Treatment Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly
Storage Weekly Weekly . .
Distribution Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly
Implementation of water 
quality control programs
Chlorine in water Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regularly cleans 
filters
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 9:  Technical Assessment of Water Utilities: Maintenance
 
   
Private utilities also implement water control programs more diligently than 
public utilities.  All utilities, except the public utility in Kandal, put chlorine in water 
regularly.  However, only private utilities clean filters on a regular basis.  The public   26
utilities in Battambang and Kampong C hhang clean filters only when there is an 
overflow.  The public utility in Svay Rieng has no filters since it has no water treatment 
facilities, and the utility in Kandal does nothing to filters since its treatment facilities are 
out of operation.      
 
 
C.  Financial Performance 
 
Almost all residential customers, regardless of whether they are served by private 
or public utilities, pay their bills within 30 days.  As Table 10 shows, 90 percent of more 
of residential customers in each town, except in Battambang, pay their water bills on 
time.  This is remarkable given that two of the three private utilities that responded to this 




Five of the six utilities that agreed to share information about their revenues and 
expenditures had made a profit last year.  The exception, Kampong Chhang, essentially 
covered all expenses.  Further, one of the two private utilities, Kampong Speau, has a 
very high profit margin (201 percent of expenditures).  All the other utilities have a profit 





                                                 
11 All of these utilities also provide waters services to a small number of offices of governmental agencies; 
these customers range from less than one percent to 4.6 percent of the utilities’ total direct connections.  
Two of the public utilities (Kampong Speau and Kandal) and two of the private utilities (Battambang and 
Kampong Chhang) report that these public customers are more than 90 days late in paying their water bills.   27
Table 10: Technical Assessment of Water Utilities: Financial Performance
Battambang Kandal Kampong Chhang Svay Rieng
What percentage of residential 
customers has paid bill within 30 
days?
85 98 95 100
In practice, after what period of time 
is service cut-off for non-payment?
40 90 never 20
 Tariff revenues  694,121,152          40,522,000           30,761,400           24,321,800    
 Other revenues  7,780,000              -                       2,296,500             -                 
 Total revenue  701,901,152          40,522,000           33,057,900           24,321,800    
 Total expenditures  615,355,328          35,400,000           33,780,640           22,851,200    
Profits 86,545,824           5,122,000            -722,740 1,470,600      
14% 14% -2% 6%
Banteay 
Meanchey
Kampong Speau Kien Svay Takeo
What percentage of residential 
customers has paid bill within 30 
days?
90 100 . 100
In practice, after what period of time 
is service cut-off for non-payment?
never 30 . never
 Tariff revenues  339,365,280          302,400,000         . 4,815,400      
 Other revenues  182,958,064          60,800,000           . 27,702,000    
 Total revenue  522,323,344          363,200,000         . -
 Total expenditures  451,813,728          120,840,000         . .
Profits 70,509,616           242,360,000        . .
16% 201% . .





   
  In sum, the results of the technical assessment indicate that private utilities 
perform better than public utilities.  To ensure continued operation and performance, 
private companies, unlike public utilities, maintain their facilities on a regular basis.  
Public companies, by contrast, tend to carry out maintenance work only as a response to 
crisis.  Financially, private and public utilities have relatively similar performance. 
 
 
6.  Access to Water Services  
 
What kind of households (in terms of the level of income and education) do these 
private and public utilities serve?  The motivation for addressing this question is 
straightforward: given the low coverage of utilities, is there evidence that the poor, 
because of lack of interest or lack of resources, have not been able to afford either public   28
services or the better performing (and more expensive) private services?  If so, what are 
the implied policy implications?  
 
  Table 11 establishes that households with higher incomes and more household 
wealth are significantly more likely to be connected to a piped service -- and that this 
difference is further attenuated in towns served exclusively by private utilities.  First, 
columns (1) and (4) of Table 11 show that the estimated income and expenditures of all 
connected households (798,457 and 758,356 Riels) are more than twice the respective 
figures for all unconnected households (313,742 and 329,678 Riels).  This is consistent 
with the results of an independent assessment of household income levels based on the 
survey team’s observations of the characteristics of the household.  Eighty six percent of 
all connected households were assessed to be middle or high income, as opposed to 22 
percent of all unconnected households. As one would expect, given the positive 
correlation between income and education, unconnected household also have lower levels 
of education than connected households: thirty five percent of the heads of all 
unconnected households report that they have no primary education, in contrast to 18 
percent of all connected households. 
 
Second, columns (3) and (7) of Table 11 show that the estimated income and 
expenditures of connected households served by private utilities (881,226 and 791,077 
Riels) are about three times the respective figures for all unconnected households in 
towns with private utilities (278,365 and 293,626 Riels).  This even greater difference 
between the wealth and income of connected and unconnected households in these towns 
is also found in the comparisons of the assessment of household income levels (85 
percent middle or high income versus 16 percent middle or high income) and education 






                                                 
12 Since Kandal has both public and private utilities, the demographics for the unconnected households in 
this town are reported separately, in column 6 of Table 11.   29











In towns with 
public 
utilities




In towns with 
private 
utilities
Income and wealth 
Monthly income (Riels) 798,457         734,082         881,226        313,742          311,865         369,131          278,365         
Monthly expenditures (Riels) 758,356         730,980         791,077        329,678          351,918         354,387          293,626         
Low-income 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.78 0.72 0.79 0.81
Middle- income 0.60 0.62 0.57 0.21 0.26 0.21 0.15
High-income 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Have electricity 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.87 0.87 0.98 0.79
Own a color television 0.90 0.92 0.89 0.63 0.65 0.81 0.49
Own a car 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.07
Own a house 0.94 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.98
Level of Schooling
No schooling 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.30 0.35 0.13 0.37
Primary only 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.21 0.19 0.28 0.18
Secondary 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.41 0.26
High school 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.13
Post-high school 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01
Sample size 451 251 200 375 125 100 150
Notes: share of connected and unconnected households, respectively, with listed characteristics. 
See text for description of characteristics.
Incomes and expenditures in Cambodian Riels (3763 Riels/1 US$)
Connected households Unconnected households
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Do the results in Table 11 imply that low income households simply can not 
afford a piped connection--particularly in the  towns with the more expensive private 
services?  As detailed in Table 12, the majority of unconnected households interviewed 
report that they would be interested in getting a piped connection.  While 41 percent of 
unconnected households on average report that they are satisfied with their current 
service (with a range of 14 percent in Takeo to 62 percent in Kampong Chhang), 86 
percent note that they would be interested in getting a piped connection.  Given this level 
of interest among unconnected households, what are the constraints to getting such a 
connection? 
 
Utilities’ limited service area and high connection fees are the two most common 
reasons for households not having piped connections.  On the supply side, a relatively 
large share of households (forty two percent) states that the utility does not serve their 
area (with a range of 12 percent in Kampong Speau and Battambang to sixty percent in 
Takeo).  On the demand side, 35 percent state that the connection fee is too high (with a 
range of 17 percent in Svay Rieng to 52 percent in Kampong Speau), while very few 
(eight percent) state that the monthly tariff is too expensive.   
 
  In particular, connection fees, not the level of monthly water tariffs, constrain the 
access of the poor to water services.  U sing the independent assessments of household 
income levels, 37 percent of low-income unconnected households report that the 
connection fee is too high, in contrast to 29 percent of middle- and high-income 
unconnected households.  By contrast, there is no (statistically significant) difference 
between these types of households in their response about the monthly tariff: 8.3 percent 
of low-income unconnected households report that the monthly tariff is too high, in 
contrast to 9.1 percent of middle- and high-income unconnected households.  Taken 
together, these results suggest that the poor are willing to pay for piped water, but in 
many cases are unwilling (or unable) to pay, for the cost of getting connected.  
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Table 12: Assessment of alternative water services: unconnected characteristics













Evaluation of current water source
Satisfied with current 
water source 0.41 0.28 0.62 0.56 0.46 0.30 0.38 0.14
(0.49) (0.46) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.46) (0.49) (0.35)
Interested in getting a 
piped connection 0.86 0.96 0.78 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.94 0.90
(0.35) (0.20) (0.42) (0.39) (0.37) (0.35) (0.24) (0.31)
Why are you not connected?
Utility doesn't serve 
area  0.42 0.12 0.54 0.36 0.48 0.48 0.12 0.60
(0.49) (0.33) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.33) (0.49)
Alternative water 
source 0.55 0.16 0.50 0.54 0.68 0.56 0.54 0.56
(0.50) (0.37) (0.51) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Connection fee is too 
high 0.35 0.40 0.33 0.17 0.41 0.30 0.52 0.28
(0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.38) (0.49) (0.46) (0.54) (0.45)
Monthly tariff is too 
expensive  0.08 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.28 0.08
(0.28) 0.00 (0.31) 0.00 (0.24) (0.14) (0.45) (0.27)
Notes: Means and (standard deviations) for water variables.  See text for variable description
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  This implies that if utilities want to expand their coverage and the scale of 
operations, they need make connections more affordable.  This does not necessarily mean 
that connection fees need to be reduced.  The first step to expand access might instead be 
to provide households an option to spread the financial burden of a connection over 
longer period of time by allowing them to pay the connection fee in installments. 
 
 
7.  Conclusions  
 
  This paper has compared the performance and consumer satisfaction with water 
services provided by four private companies and four public utilities in Cambodia.   The 
comparison was based on results of a survey of households served by these utilities and 
on results of a technical assessment of each water system carried out by a water engineer.   
 
  The results indicate that households served private utilities are significantly more 
satisfied with the piped water than customers of public utilities.  The daily availability 
and quality of piped water is better in households served by private than by public 
utilities.  Also, customers of private utilities experience fewer service interruptions.  This 
has not happened by accident.  Private utilities hire more educated staff whom they pay 
higher salaries; maintain their facilities more regularly; and implement water quality 
control programs more diligently.  Private sector operators seem to face stronger 
incentives than public utilities to keep their customers satisfied. 
 
  However, according to results, this improved service does not come for free.  
Households served by private utilities pay for the piped water service significantly more 
than customers of public utilities.  The connection fees as well as unit tariffs charged by 
private utilities are higher than fees and tariffs of public utilities.  Some lower-income 
households that are not served by private utilities are partially limited by the high 
connection fees (as opposed to the regular monthly payments). 
 
  Overall, this paper indicates that the bold effort of a few towns and private sector 
participants to introduce private sector involvement in the water sector is encouraging in 
many ways.  But the full gains, which are possible, have not yet been realized.  Earlier, it 
was stressed why the commercial incentive for positive net revenue from operations tends 
to lead the private entrepreneur to be responsive to the demand for services from actual 
and potential future customers and to economize on costs while doing so.  This 
commercial incentive is likely to be stronger if the privatization option used is a lease or 
concession arrangement, rather than a service or management contract, since the operator 
in the former cases has access to the revenue stream over a number of years, rather than a 
fixed fee which is normal in service and management contracts.  It pays the operator to 
increase net revenue (revenues in excess of costs) in the former cases.  In this regard, 
BOT (build, own, and transfer) arrangements are a mixed bag.  Usually, BOTs are for 
only part of the system, for example, source works to increase capacity of the system.  
Since, in this case, the private operator is not responsible for distribution, the operator 
will normally require a ‘take or pay’ contract (a guarantee that a minimum amount will 
be purchased regardless of the amount sold by the distributor).  This clearly relieves the   33
BOT operator of the incentive to be demand responsive in the choice of investments, 
although not of the desirability of controlling costs. 
 
  The set of commercial incentives facing utilities would clearly be made stronger if 
there was competition for the market.  As the paper indicates, the initial private sector 
initiatives in Cambodia have not had this feature.  Consequently, the commercial 
incentives to be demand-responsive and to control costs have not been as strong as would 
be desirable.  This is particularly true in the water sector because of the relatively high 
capital costs and longevity of assets.  Private operators normally require, even with full 
control of the revenue stream, fairly extensive periods to recover investment costs.   
 
  This paper shows that private sector operators have been willing to come forth 
and that commercial incentives, however much weakened by uncertainty about the 
direction and scope of future regulation of the sector, are working to improve the water 
supply situation.  The study also shows that in the current situation there is not a 
completely clear-cut case for the superiority of the private sector over the public sector in 
all respects.  This is to be expected.  Nevertheless, if the regulatory structure, which the 
Government of Cambodia intends to put into place, encourages the commercial 
incentives to be more demand-responsive and cost conscious, and, further, reinforces the 
market incentives of competition, rather than leaving the private sector operators open to 
arbitrary government action, the private sector is a good bet. 
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